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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44711
)
v. ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO.
) CR 2005-6906




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Dean Hogan appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
credit for time served.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October of 2005, Mr. Hogan pled guilty to felony injury to a child in the instant
case arising out of Twin Falls County (“Twin Falls case”). (R., pp.63, 66.) On
December 12, 2005, the district court sentenced him to ten years, with five years fixed,
suspended his sentence, and placed him on probation for five years. (R., pp.66–68.)
During this time, Mr. Hogan was already on probation in a separate case arising out of
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Cassia County (“Cassia case”). (R., pp.75, 191, 197.) Due to Mr. Hogan’s guilty plea in
the Twin Falls case, the district court found Mr. Hogan violated his probation in the
Cassia case. (R., pp.75, 191, 197.) On December 15, 2005, the district court revoked
his probation in the Cassia case and executed his sentence of five years, with three
years fixed. (R., pp.75, 191.) As such, Mr. Hogan was incarcerated in the Cassia case
while also on probation in the Twin Falls case. (R., pp.191, 197, 203.) On February 19,
2009, Mr. Hogan was released on parole in the Cassia case. (R., p.191.) He was still on
probation in the Twin Falls case. (R., pp.191, 197.)
Then, in July in 2010, the district court extended Mr. Hogan’s probation for two
years after he admitted to violating his probation. (R., pp.125–28.) In December of 2011,
the district court revoked Mr. Hogan’s probation, executed his sentence, and retained
jurisdiction after he admitted to violating his probation a second time. (R., pp.168–72.)
On April 23, 2012, the district court subsequently relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.174–
76.)
On September 2, 2016, Mr. Hogan filed a pro se motion for credit for time served
in the Twin Falls case. (R., pp.190–93.) He requested credit from December 12, 2005,
to February 19, 2009, during which time he was on probation in the Twin Falls case, but
also incarcerated in the Cassia case. (R., pp.191–92, 203.) He stated:
Hogan relies upon Idaho Code §18-309(1), in where it states in
part; “In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom
the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, . . .”, and Idaho
Code §20-209A, Computation of Term, which holds in part; “The time
during which the person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail,
facility under the control of the board of correction, or from the custody of
an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or counted as a part of
the term for which he was sentenced.”
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Here, Hogan was in custody of the State Board of Correction from
December 12, 2005, to February 19, 2009, 1527 days before he was
released from the Southern Idaho Correctional Institution (“SICI”) on
Parole for the Cassia County case, but was still serving Probation for the
charge in this Twin Falls case. As such, Hogan was not voluntarily absent
from the penitentiary, or facility under the control of the state board of
correction, and the time served (1527 days) must be counted towards his
sentence even though he was on probation.
(R., p.192 (omission in original).)The State responded to his motion,1 and Mr. Hogan
replied. (R., pp.196–98, 200–02.) Shortly thereafter, the district court issued an order
denying Mr. Hogan’s motion. (R., pp.203–04.) The district court ruled:
Not all periods of confinement qualify to count towards the
defendant’s sentence in a particular case.
An entitlement to credit under I.C. § 18-309 depends upon
the answer to a simple inquiry: was the defendant’s
incarceration upon the offense for which he was sentenced?
If a particular period of confinement served prior to the
imposition of sentence is not attributable to the charge or
conduct for which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender
is not entitled to credit for such confinement; neither does
the sentencing judge err by denying credit under such
circumstances.
State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1989). A defendant is not,
moreover, entitled to credit for time spent on probation, because he is not
"incarcerated" as required by the statute. Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866,
869 (Ct. App. 2008).
Applying these rules to the defendant’s case, it is clear to this Court
he is not entitled to the requested relief. During the period of time between
December 12, 2005 and February 19, 2009, the defendant was on
probation in this case. Therefore, any incarceration during this time was
not “upon the offense for which he was sentenced.” Such incarceration
was instead attributable to his Cassia County case.
(R., pp.203-04.)
Mr. Hogan timely appealed from the district court’s order. (R., pp.206–08.)
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ISSUE
Mindful of Idaho law, did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hogan’s motion for
credit for time served?
ARGUMENT
Mindful Of Idaho Law, The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hogan’s Motion For
Credit For Time Served
Idaho Code § 18-309 provides:
(1) In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as
part of such term.
(2) In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended
judgment.
I.C. § 18-309. The first section of I.C. § 18-309 “requires courts to give a person credit
on his sentence for the time he served in jail before he was convicted of or pled guilty to
his crime.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015). Under this section, “a district court
may only give credit for the correct amount of time actually served by the defendant
prior to imposition of judgment in the case; the district court does not have discretion to
award credit for time served that is either more or less than that.” State v. Moore, 156
1 As noted by the State, December 12, 2005, to February 19, 2009, is 1,165 days.
(R., p.196.)
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Idaho 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2014). The second section of I.C. § 18-309 mandates an award
of credit for time served as a condition of probation. See I.C. § 18-309(2).
Related to section (2) of I.C. § 18-309, I.C. § 19-2603 provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
I.C. § 19-2603. This statute “governs credit for time served as it relates to the revocation
of probation.” State v. Denny, 157 Idaho 217, 219 (Ct. App. 2014).
Here, Mr. Hogan’s incarceration for which he seeks credit did not occur prior to
his entry of a guilty plea and initial sentencing, thus triggering I.C. § 18-309(1).
Moreover, his incarceration was not “for the offense  . . . for which the judgment was
entered.” I.C. § 18-309(1). It was for the Cassia case. Second, Mr. Hogan’s
incarceration was not served as a condition of his probation or after service of an arrest
warrant for an alleged probation violation, thus triggering I.C. § 18-309(2) or I.C. § 19-
2603. Despite the fact that Idaho’s statutes do not mandate an award of credit under the
circumstances here, Mr. Hogan nonetheless submits the district court erred by denying
his motion for credit for time served. The district court should have awarded Mr. Hogan
credit for time served while on probation in the Twin Falls case, but also incarcerated in




Mr. Hogan respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
denying his motion for credit for time served and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2017.
___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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